Abstract. In this paper we engage with the liberalist project in organization
Organization 14(6) Articles
The idea of the common public good has been under attack for some time now. The 1980s were characterized by the relentless rise of neo-liberalism in the United States and Britain. Reagan's and Thatcher's neo-liberalist agenda was about minimizing state bureaucracy and control through a whole range of policies: cutting taxes, making governmental departments and agencies more fl exible, privatization of state companies, de-regulation of markets, reducing the welfare state to a bare minimum of services, making labour and other laws more fl exible and thus increasing corporate power, encouraging entrepreneurship and private initiative-to name but a few (for a discussion of neo-liberal policies in the UK see Leys, 2003) . These policies were guided by the belief that the state and its bureaucracy should be reduced to an absolute minimum in order to let markets regulate themselves and individuals take personal initiative and responsibility. In some way neo-liberalism is thus about establishing a certain openness, a freedom of the individual from the state. The 1990s saw the rapid expansion of neo-liberalist policies across Europe and the world, and one could say that neo-liberalism has become a truly global phenomenon today (Chomsky, 1998; Giroux, 2004; Hertz, 2001) .
Within the realm of Organization and Management Studies (OMS), the rise of neo-liberalism coincided with an unforgiving assault on the bureaucracy. What has been under attack by a whole army of organization and management theorists and practitioners for more than two decades now is the alleged inertia and ineffi ciency of bureaucratic ways of organizing. They suggest that bureaucratic forms of managerial control are not fi t to respond effectively to the increasing pressures exerted by globalization, the explosion of information, and the general speed of today's 'hypercompetitive' markets (Boyett and Boyett, 2001 ). Management has to be able to thrive on today's 'chaotic' world, as Peters (1987) , one of the antibureaucratic management gurus, claims; and the best way to do this is for organizations to liberate themselves from the restrictions of bureaucracy (Peters, 1992) . This kind of rhetoric has resulted in a whole range of antibureaucratic management techniques and approaches, such as culture management, downsizing, total quality management (TQM), knowledge management, decentralization, self-organization, enterprise culture and business process reengineering (BPR). Instead of hierarchical command, rules, procedures, and rational decision-making, post-bureaucratic management is about fl at hierarchies, creativity, innovation, knowledge sharing, network structures and enterprise. To put it differently, instead of bureaucratic closure and tight hierarchical control, it is said that today's management must embrace openness and fl exible structures.
Whilst post-bureaucratic techniques of management and organization are well embedded in both theory and practice today (e.g. Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994) , equally well established are the critiques of these techniques. Organization, for example, recently offered a special issue entitled 'Bureaucracy in the Age of Enterprise', which aimed to develop a more Žižek and the Impossibility of the Open Society Christian de Cock and Steffen Böhm nuanced and grounded view of the bureaucracy and the claims of the need to go beyond it (Courpasson and Reed, 2004) . As bureaucratic forms of management and organization come under ever more vicious attack, critics are interested in studying the ideological content behind these attacks and assessing the costs involved when fl exibility and networks take over from bureaucratic structures. Willmott (1993) , for example, critically examined the management culture literature which emerged in the 1980s and showed that behind the post-bureaucratic rhetoric of freedom, autonomy and self-organization lurk new forms of control, domination and surveillance (for futher examples see Courpasson, 2000; Knights and Willmott, 2000; Reed, 1999) .
One of the most consistent defences of the bureaucracy and critique of post-bureaucratic discourse has come from within what can be called liberalist organization studies. The most outspoken representative of this fi eld of study is Paul du Gay (1994b Gay ( , 2000b Gay ( , 2003 Gay ( , 2004 , who, over the course of a decade, has published in the journal Organization alone four papers that explicitly engage with the defence of bureaucratic forms of organizing and the exposure of the limitations of post-bureaucratic managerial discourses. Other writers in this fi eld include Adler and Borys (1996) , Armbrüster (2003) , Armbrüster and Gebert (2002) and Gebert and Boerner (1999) , all of whom have contributed to a project that aims to critique ideologies of post-bureaucratic management and defend a liberalist ethos of bureaucratic organization.
In this paper we will engage with the liberalist tradition in OMS and outline its critique of post-bureaucratic discourses. We will, fi rstly, contextualize our argument in the philosophical tradition of liberalism and point to the controversies within it. We will show that there are important differences in the way different strands of liberalism conceptualize openness, and these differences, we will argue, have an important political impact. We will then apply these philosophical arguments to a review of liberalist OMS. The second part of the paper will contain a critique of this literature through the work of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. Liberalist organization and management theorists argue that an open society can be maintained by establishing effective institutional structures that can rationally control the excesses of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism. Žižek, in contrast, points to the impossibility of such a project and suggests that precisely the liberalist discourse of an 'open society' is essential for the continued ideological maintenance of a capitalist system that is fundamentally not open but closed.
Liberalism and the Open Society
Liberalist thought has a long and rich tradition that goes back to Enlightenment philosophers, such as, for example, Hobbes (1998) , Kant (1998) and Mill (1982) . The philosophies of the Enlightenment provided the groundwork for the political philosophies of Berlin (2002) , Holmes (1995) , Popper (1945) Organization 14(6) Articles and Rawls (1996) , who can be seen as the main proponents of liberalist thought in the post-war Anglo-Saxon tradition. It was particularly Popper's two-volume work The Open Society and its Enemies, published in Britain at the end of the Second World War, which has had an immense infl uence on political philosophy and popular political discourse.
Popper, an Austrian who fl ed from German-occupied Vienna by emigrating to New Zealand in the 1930s and later to England, passionately argued that the liberalist open society is the only effective defence against totalitarian ideologies. He saw German Nazism as the late rise of a magical, tribal, collectivist society that he called 'closed society ' (1945: 173) . For Popper, a closed society functions like an organism resembling a herd or tribe whose members are held together by semi-natural and biological ties, such as kinship. However, the event of reason and knowledge, Popper argues, renders the natural and organic community impossible and undesirable:
Our dream of heaven cannot be realized on earth. Once we begin to rely upon our reason, and to use our powers of criticism, once we feel the call of personal responsibilities, and with it, the responsibility of helping to advance knowledge, we cannot return to a state of implicit submission to tribal magic. For those who have eaten of the tree of knowledge, paradise is lost. (1945: 200) For Popper, reason and knowledge are the main distinguishing factors between humans and animals. For him, 'there is no return to a harmonious state of nature. If we turn back, then we must go the whole way-we must return to the beasts ' (1945: 201) . Our task therefore is not, in his view, to look back to a harmonious, organic past-the closed whole-but to embrace the power of openness, reason, and knowledge that lets us question and criticize our being in the world.
Popper's open society promotes debate and a critical ethos that makes us reason about competing views and knowledges. Truth, in his view, is not a harmonious universal, but something that can only be achieved through piecemeal changes and a cooperative effort. His ideal of an open society is characterized by the need for individuals to make rational decisions about their positions in the world (1945: 173) . In his view, this inevitably leads to a struggle between different groups, as some members of society try to take the place of others and try to advance socially (1945: 174) . This makes necessary strong democratic and legal institutions as well as personal democratic responsibility. The task of democratic institutions is thus to make sure that every member of society is equal before the law. But this law is not magic, that is, it is not pre-given by a higher, perhaps natural, order. Instead, the law is man-made, which means that in Popper's view we have a responsibility to construct good democratic laws. In contrast to Plato's view, Popper argues that a democracy can only work if the individual is not fully subsumed by the greater whole (1945: 100ff) , as this would be a step towards a closed, totalitarian regime. Instead, for Popper, a democracy needs to ensure the individual freedom of every member of society, which must also include the ability for individuals to critique the democratic Žižek and the Impossibility of the Open Society Christian de Cock and Steffen Böhm system. Democratic critique, Popper maintains, is vital for the survival of a democracy; and Socrates, who was a strong critic of Plato's democratic Republic in ancient Athens, needs to be regarded as the real democrat in Popper's view (1945: 189) .
In a recent book Soros, the Hungarian-born philantropist-billionnaire, follows in Popper's footsteps by arguing that the open society 'has the great merit of assuring freedom of thought and speech giving ample scope to experimentation and creativity ' (2000: 3) ' (2000: 21) , Soros is a fi rm believer in the ability of democratic capitalism to constantly improve itself. Therefore, there is no need to abolish capitalism; rather, 'we should endeavour to correct its shortcomings ' (2000: xxiv) . He argues, for example, that if we can correct the disparity between economic and political organization of the world, recognize the errors of 'market fundamentalism', and create 'the rules and institutions that are necessary for the coexistence of the plethora of individuals and the multiplicity of communities that make up a global society' (2000: 129), we will be able to actualize the open society. This sits well next to Popper's (1945: 113) call for the need of effective institutions that can socially engineer society and protect it from its enemies. These institutions should not only work on national levels, but they should also be able to set up control mechanisms at the international level.
Popper Strauss' philosophy (e.g. 1959 Strauss' philosophy (e.g. , 1989 )-although within the tradition of liberalism-argues against, what he calls, the relativism of the 'open society' concept, whose 'consistent denial of the common good requires a radical 'individualism' (Strauss, 1989: 149-50 (Strauss, 1989: 150) . In this way the public administration is supposed to be a mere spectator-its purpose is to be neutral in the confl ict between liberal democracy and its enemies; a non-ideological regime (Strauss, 1989: 152) . 'No wonder then that the new political science has nothing to say against those who unhesitatingly prefer surrender, that is the abandonment of liberal democracy, to war' (Strauss, 1989: 155) . Strauss argues passionately against such a surrender. For him, there is a need for an enlightened elite that would promote and defend the liberal standards of democracy: 'Education to perfect gentlemanship, to human excellence, liberal education consists in reminding oneself of human excellence, of human greatness' (Strauss, 1989: 316) . Strauss thinks that the value-free administration of liberal democracy (à la Popper and Soros) is not only not possible, but dangerous. For him, liberal democracy must be putting forward strong values and virtues that aspire to what he calls 'human greatness'.
Some commentators, such as Drury (1999) , have recently pointed to the close links between the policies promoted by the neo-conservative American Right and Strauss' philosophies. For example, Wolfowitz and Shulsky, two important representatives of the Bush administration, were students of Strauss at the University of Chicago. According to Drury (1999) , there are three key aspects to Strauss' philosophy that have been picked up by neo-conservative politicians: deception, the power of religion, and aggressive nationalism. These Straussian principles of democratic politics point to the need for the masses to be subjected to strong leadershipreligious, ideological, nationalistic or otherwise-that can glue together various social actors. The Bush administration has made extensive use of these principles, as it has been promoting neo-liberalism and aggressive foreign policies around the world (Lobe, 2003) .
For Harvey the drift towards neo-conservativism is a response to the 'inherent instability of the neoliberal state ' (2005: 82) . While neoconservatives agree with neo-liberals about the need to maintain the freedom of markets and reduce the power of state administration, neoconservative thought sees great dangers in the pluralist, relativist, and individualist outcomes of neo-liberal disorganizations of society. Therefore, it is concerned to reinstate a certain 'order as an answer to the chaos of individual interests' and actively put forward 'an overweening morality as the necessary social glue to keep the body secure in the face of external and internal dangers' (Harvey, 2005: 82) . The 'war on terror' is arguably such a social glue that hopes to provide a new moral purpose for those societies whose social mechanisms have often been substantially disorganized by neo-liberal doctrines of privatization, market liberalization and individualism.
Žižek and the Impossibility of the Open Society Christian de Cock and Steffen Böhm
What the struggle between Strauss-inspired politics and the Popperian promotion of the open society shows is that liberalism is indeed a project that has produced a variety of different theoretical and political interpretations. This is the key argument made in Gray's (2000) Two Faces of Liberalism. Although there is not enough space to engage with this book in any detail here, it is useful for us at this stage to point to Gray's two competing 'faces' of liberalism. The fi rst face is based on the assumption that liberalism is a system of universal principles. In this view liberalism is a political doctrine that promotes 'liberal values as if they were universally authoritative' (Gray, 2000: 33) . Although Gray does not explicitly explore this, one could argue that this fi rst face of liberalism can be linked to the thought of Strauss and its pro-active application by the Bush administration that aims to promote values of 'democracy and freedom' as well as neo-liberal economic policies around the globe, if necessary by force. As discussed earlier, for Strauss, liberalism needs to be injected with a strong moral purpose and leadership that can protect society from the follies of liberal relativism and individualism. Here, liberalism is a 'prescription, universal in authority and application, for an ideal regime' (Gray, 2000: 69) , which assumes a certain induced consensus on what a liberalist social organization should look like.
In contrast, the second face, which Gray calls modus vivendi, pursues the coexistence of different ways of life and aims at 'reconciling the claims of confl icting values' (Gray, 2000: 33 ). Popper's and Soros' ideas on the open society are more easily recognizable in Gray's second face of modus vivendi liberalism, as both emphasize the need for a constant reform of the institutions of liberal democracy. In contrast to the universal conceptions of neo-conservative liberalism, which aims to put forward a leading value of a liberalist organization of society, modus vivendi liberalism assumes the existence of incommensurable and confl icting values in society, which cannot be reconciled by way of a single solution: modus vivendi 'can no longer be identifi ed with particular values' (Gray, 2000: 138) . That is, it does not aim to promote one way of life around the world; instead, modus vivendi hopes to ensure the co-existence of many ways of life (Gray, 2000: 139) .
Two Faces of Organizational Liberalism
Popper's work, although very infl uential in the wider spheres of the social sciences, has had comparatively little exposure in organization and management theory in the past decade. Recently, however, Armbrüster and Gebert (2002) have produced a thoughtful paper on Popper, using his political philosophies to critique a range of currently popular anti-bureaucratic and collectivist forms of work organization. They show that Popper's thought can be productively used to point to some shortcomings and dangers of, for example, the enterprise and excellence literatures, which offer a range of new 'post-bureaucratic' management techniques that are said to be more suitable for today's challenging times characterized by complexity and Organization 14(6) Articles ambiguity (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) . In their view, Popper's work warns us of the often unfounded dismissal of legitimate bureaucratic structures that aim to enable openness and the application of procedural laws. Instead, managerialist calls for fl exibility and openness, which are accompanied by the destruction of bureaucratic forms of organizing, lead to more closed social relations in the Popperian sense. Armbrüster and Gebert's (2002) argument closely follows du Gay's (1994a Gay's ( , 2000a occupation of more than a decade to expose the internal inconsistencies and dangers of various discourses that have attacked bureaucratic ways of organizing on a variety of fronts. 'In popular usage', du Gay says, 'the term 'bureaucracy' is most strongly associated with the defects of large organizations in both public and private sectors ' (2000a: 80) . Naming an organization 'bureaucratic' popularly implies ineffi ciency, slowness, hierarchical decision-making, waste of resources, burdensome rules and impersonality. To critique the burgeoning anti-bureaucratic management and organization discourse, du Gay (2000a: 61ff) engages particularly with what could be called the 'thriving on chaos' literature (Peters, 1987 (Peters, , 1992 , a managerial literature that Tom Peters sums up by saying: 'I beg each and every one of you to develop a passionate and public hatred of bureaucracy' (cited in du Gay, 2000a: 61). Du Gay argues that this 'hatred of bureaucracy' is characterized by a contemporary management discourse which sees 'work not as a painful obligation imposed upon individuals, nor as an activity undertaken for mainly instrumental purposes, but rather as a vital means to individual liberty and self-fulfi lment (2000a: 64).
Similar to the neo-conservative politics inspired by Strauss (1959 Strauss ( , 1989 , anti-bureaucratic management gurus do not simply call for disorganization and chaos, although Peters' managerial language, for example, gives such an impression. Instead, they often exchange the bureau with some form of strong company culture. This culture is said to be managed by charismatic leaders who insert a passion for excellence into the organization (Peters and Waterman, 1982) . Peters' managerial recipes call for leaders to provide 'simple, crisp and clear visions', which, once enforced, will allow 'lots of room for autonomy, creative expression, and love, care and empathy' (Peters and Austin, 1985: 484) . The freedom of creativity and bottom-up organizing, it seems, is enforced through a hierarchical top-down approach. Peters' anti-bureaucratic rhetoric, which is fully in line with the neo-liberal discourse that has shaped political debates since the early 1980s, is thus accompanied by the establishment of new institutional hierarchies. These hierarchies are no longer bureaucratic in nature; instead, there is a certain pre-modern feel to them, as Boje and Rosile (n.d.) note: 'Tom Peters preaches the Protestant ethic. This is the demand for the work of Tom Peters: to heal the wounds of downsizing, forgive the feelings of rage at the loss of the fellowship, and to preach the new work ethic under the postmodern conditions of late capitalism'. Peters, Boje and Rosile maintain, is the new management evangelist who aims to repair the wounds produced by What is important to realize is that Peters is not simply a management guru who aims at increasing effi ciency, creativity and profi t levels in private companies. As du Gay shows throughout his work (e.g. 2000a: 81ff), the managerial, anti-bureaucratic, spirit has also taken hold in the 'public sector'. In times of global competitiveness between nations the bureaucratic state is often seen as something that hinders economic activity within and between national economies. What is generally understood as neo-liberalism-also referred to as market liberalism-advocates the view that there is no alternative to the discourse of management and the capitalist market, which is said to have proven to be an effi cient and effective way of organizing economic activity. Du Gay discusses, for example, a range of attempts to manage public service organizations more like entrepreneurial corporations, which are characterized by fl at hierarchies, teamwork, internal markets and selfresponsibility. This entrepreneurialism is supposed to make public services more agile and cost the taxpayer less money to run. However, not only are public services run as if they are companies; increasingly they are also run for profi t. The 1980s and 1990s saw immense privatization programmes, and today even state schools and hospitals are operated by companies that are not only interested in delivering a good public service but also in their profi t levels (Monbiot, 2001 ). This has been both a national phenomenon and a global one. As many critics of globalization show (e.g. Frank, 2001; Hertz, 2001; Klein, 2001) , neo-liberal policies now set the agenda in many parts of world-often enforced by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other non-governmental organizations controlled by Western governments and business interests.
The response by du Gay (2000a) and other organizational liberalists (e.g. Adler and Borys, 1996; Armbrüster, 2002 Armbrüster, , 2003 Armbrüster and Gebert, 2002) to the attacks on bureaucracy by anti-bureaucratic management writers and neo-liberals is one that stresses the need for a return to the bureaucratic ethos. Organizational liberalists emphasize the need to organize democratic society through bureaucratic institutions. As Armbrüster writes, 'from a liberalist viewpoint, there are no means other than institutional ones for securing plurality ' (2003: 23) , that is, freedom and democracy. Organizational liberalists believe in the plurality of life forms which are governed by contingent political and ethical rules. On the one hand, the bureau is seen as one of these life forms itself; following Weber, du Gay, for example, asserts that the bureau must be seen as an institution that is guided by its own moral conduct (2000a: 5, 10). On the other hand, the bureau is also seen to ensure the plurality of different life forms in society at large. The bureaucrat is characterized as someone who has a 'strict adherence to procedure, commitment to the purpose of the offi ce, abnegation of personal moral enthusiasms, [and] acceptance of sub-and super-ordination ' (du Gay, 2000a: 44) . The bureaucrat is thought to be someone who can make impartial and impersonal decisions by way Organization 14(6) Articles of the bureau being a separate and rationally operating life-world in its own right. The bureaucrat is seen to be able to mediate between confl icting groups of society and ensure a plurality of competing life forms. In short, organizational liberalists see bureaucratic institutions as the only way to keep the excesses of capitalist society under control. The renewed consideration of bureaucratic control, Armbrüster (2003) argues, is of particular importance in the light of recent corporate scandals. In his view these occurred because no adequate institutional framework was in place to ensure the proper running of companies. Put differently, the neo-liberal enterprise discourse that preaches to get rid of all bureaucratic structures has blinded many companies to the necessity of institutional control mechanisms to ensure procedures are in place that can prevent corporate wrong-doing.
Considering the two faces of liberalism discussed in the previous section, one could argue that a similar split occurs in OMS. Large parts of antibureaucratic management discourses-especially the neo-liberal enterprise and excellence discourses-so vividly expressed in Peters' (1992) Liberation Management -invoke Gray's (2000) fi rst face of liberalism, which is based on principles that universally announce the death of the bureaucracy, replacing it with an almost religious call for strong leadership, on the one hand, and communitarian values on the other. In fact, du Gay (2000a: 66ff) exposes the discourse of 'vision management' as being based on a JudaeoChristian tradition. The link one can establish here to the current faith-based language used by the Bush administration is not coincidental.
In contrast, the arguments put forward by organizational liberalists can be related to Gray's (2000) second face of liberalism, which emphasizes the need for effective bureaucratic institutions controlling the excesses of capitalism and managerialism: only bureaucracy is able to ensure the 'good life' in organizations through reconciling the claims of confl icting values of organizational members. Whilst the critique put forward by organizational liberalists has value in exposing the shortcomings and ideological underpinnings of neo-liberal discourses in OMS, we also see something rather disturbing and politically dangerous in their arguments. Our quarrel with organizational liberalism centres around the concept of openness and in the remaining part of this paper our critique of liberalist conceptions of openness will be mobilized through discussing some aspects of Slavoj Žižek's work.
Žižek's Other Openness
The main attraction of Žižek's work lies in his most peculiar fusion of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, continental philosophy (German Enlightenment idealism, and in particular his readings of Hegel and Kant) and Marxist political theory. With these thinkers as his theoretical bedfellows he has commented on an eclectic list of contemporary economic
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and political phenomena and forms of popular culture. Ansell-Pearson (2004: 37) insightfully remarked that Žižek's 'superior intellectual tourism' has become his calling card. He mobilizes an unsurpassed plethora of comments on cultural artefacts (e.g. the different styles of European toilets), fi lms (e.g. Hitchcock, Lynch), and popular jokes (he has a good line in sardonic Eastern European humour) and displays the talent of the true raconteur, continuously pulling against the reins of professional prudence. Žižek's writing output has been quite astonishing: over the period 1999-2004 he managed to publish 13 books, thus leading to admonishments that he 'is at risk of writing faster than he can read, and at times faster even than he can think' (Kay, 2003: 3) . Indeed, his engagements with other thinkers have often been far from careful, tending to rely on secondary commentaries (see Ansell-Pearson, 2004 on Žižek's 'encounter' with Deleuze; Gilbert, 2001 on Žižek's claims about Derrida's work). Whilst he may be rather undisciplined as a philosopher, the critics all agree that Žižek is capable of producing a set of readings that pose profound challenges to the often undemanding stories we tell ourselves about knowledge and life. Žižek is undoubtedly at his best when in his trademark move he neatly turns notions and situations on their head. He thus refuses to accept, for example, the far too cosy notion of 'open society' which he equates with intellectual and political deadlock-'closure' in other words.
In contrast to Popper's and Soros' understanding of the open society as being explicitly guided by the need to go beyond ideological regimes, Žižek's theoretical project is inherently linked to the claim that any form of social organization involves the question of ideology and fantasy. Žižek bases this claim on a particular understanding of the Lacanian RSI triad, tracing the relationship between the orders of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary (see Lacan, 1977 Lacan, , 1998 . For Lacan the symbolic is an entity which pre-exists us, and into which we are born, learning and abiding by its rules (Nicol, 2001) . One of the most fundamental insights Žižek takes from Lacan is the idea that the symbolic is always incomplete and both constituted and subverted by the Real, which shows up negatively as the outer limit of our dis course, the point at which our representations crumble and fail. The Real is thus not some kind of raw nature which is then symbolized. Rather it persists as that failure or inconsistency of reality which has to be fi lled with appearance and fantasy. It follows that fantasy is not the opposite of reality; fantasy is on the side of reality in that it sustains the subject's sense of reality (Eagleton, 2001) . Here Žižek (with Lacan) reasserts Freud's fundamental insight that we, as human subjects, are 'not at home in this world', and that there always exists a certain lack in the subject's reality (Žižek, 2003) . But what exactly is this lack? It is jouissance, which could be translated as 'enjoyment', but it is not simply 'pleasure'. Pleasure is produced by the symbolic order, the Other. Jouissance is beyond socially sanctioned pleasure; it is 'a basic compulsion to enjoy; to achieve consummate satisfaction and thereby heal the gap, or "wound" in the Organization 14(6) Articles order of being' (Žižek and Daly, 2004: 3) . Jouissance is therefore never fully attainable, it can never be assumed or incorporated into the Other and resists naming; it is structured in a fundamental fantasy.
For Žižek, the human subject can only ever plug its lack with fantasy after fantasy. This lack also points to the openness of social relations. This openness is, however, not comparable to Soros' or Popper's conception of the open society, nor comparable to the dreams of organizational liberalists. In fact one could argue that Žižek's notion of openness points to the lack of the open society that is commonly celebrated today: jouissance is structured and domesticated (with)in the fundamental fantasy of a harmonious world that can ultimately be constructed by means of establishing proper liberal democratic and capitalist social relations-our way of life.
Žižek is not one of those academics who just rant against Western liberal democracy and capitalism from the distance of their armchairs. Žižek has been politically active in his home country of Slovenia. He fi nished fi fth in the 1990 presidential elections and supported the liberal-democratic party (Harpham, 2003) . Whilst such a move fi tted in with his early writings against totalitarianism from a position that was, at least in outline, liberal; in his most recent writings he has become an increasingly virulent critic of liberal democracy which he sees as utterly intertwined with capitalism. For Žižek, the liberal appeal to 'freedom and democracy', the belief that this will save us from the abuses of capitalism, has to be challenged. As an 'old-fashioned left winger' (2002c: 39), Žižek stresses that his understanding of the open society is quite different from Soros: 'the Soros people have this ethic of the bad state versus good civic, independent structures. But sorry, in Slovenia I am for the state and against civil society! In Slovenia, civil society is equal to the right-wingers ' (2002c: 39) . Žižek rejects the 'apparent multi-cultural, neutral, liberal attitude' of a Soros-approach to openness, 'which only sees nationalistic madness around itself' and 'posits itself in a witness role ' (2002c: 41) . Figures such as Soros, he claims in typically fl amboyant style, 'are ideologically much more dangerous than crude direct market profi teers'; and he even goes as far as calling him 'ethically repulsive' (Žižek, 2004b: 152) . A more sober assessment would be that Soros' approach to the 'open society' too often tries to exclude the diffi cult questions, the proper political antagonisms, by referring to an abstract notion of liberal democracy.
Here we fi nd Žižek in full agreement with Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) notion that society does not exist: '… that there is no neutral space, no neutral reality that can be fi rst objectively described and from which we then develop the idea of antagonism. Again, this would be my idea of fantasy as constituting reality' (Žižek and Daly, 2004: 78) . Indeed, Žižek, whilst admitting to 'some political and theoretical misunderstandings between Ernesto Laclau and myself', generously acknowledges Laclau's fundamental insights into the key issues of 'antagonism, hegemony, empty signifi er' (Žižek and Daly, 2004: 41) . For Žižek, freedom is always freedom for a partic ular group to do a particular thing; which means that Žižek and the Impossibility of the Open Society Christian de Cock and Steffen Böhm freedom is necessarily located within the context of political struggle (Žižek, 2002a) . Consequently he views society as a locus of antagonistic struggle. Let us remember: Popper also saw his open society as a place of struggle between groups. The key difference between Popper and Žižek, however, is that for Žižek there can never be a rational/post-ideological mediation between competing factions of society. Freedom cannot, as organizational liberalists maintain, be secured by an institutional order of liberal-democracy bureaucratically superimposed on the public sphere. Žižek is close to Mouffe's recent writings 1 here in positing the public sphere as the battleground where different hegemonic projects confront one another without any possibility of fi nal reconciliation; yet he is at best sceptical about Mouffe's notion of 'agonistic democracy'. The lengthy passage from a recent book is important enough to be quoted in full:
Democracy' is not merely the 'power of, by, and for the people'. It is not enough just to claim that, in a democracy, the will and interests (the two do not in any way automatically coincide) of the large majority determine the state's decisions. Democracy-in the way this term is used today-concerns, above all, formal legalism: its minimal defi nition is the uncondi tional adherence to a certain set of formal rules which guarantee that antagonisms are fully absorbed into the agonistic game … Those who are old enough still remember the dull attempts of 'democratic socialists' to oppose the vision of authentic socialism to miserable 'really existing socialism'-to such an attempt, the standard Hegelian answer is quite adequate: the failure of reality to live up to its notion always bears witness to the inherent weakness of this notion itself. But why should the same not hold also for democracy itself? Is it also not all too simple to oppose to 'really existing' liberal capitalist democracy a more true 'radical' democracy? (Žižek, 2004b: 114-115) What we lose in entering Mouffe's 'agonistic game' (where opponents 'see themselves … as sharing a common symbolic space within which the confl ict takes place '-Mouffe, 2005: 805) is precisely the possibility of the creation of an alternative symbolic space.
Whilst liberalist approaches are geared towards demystifying ideology in order to achieve some kind of greater awareness which can contribute to social change, so deeply rooted in the psychic structure is Žižek's idea of ideology that there can be no change based on logical analysis. The idea of the subject who can be integrated into the socio-symbolic order without remainder equates to ideology at its purest. Indeed, Žižek relentlessly identifi es the enjoyment specifi c to the sense of duty, the illicit gratifi cation fl ourishing on the underside of adherence to procedural laws (Harpham, 2003) . Thus, the call by organizational liberalists for recovering an original bureaucratic ethos is insuffi cient. Whilst defending the role an institutional setup plays for the democratic governing of society can be a worthwhile project-particularly in relation to the popular anti-bureaucratic discourses in OMS-such attempts fail to evaluate the particular ends bureaucratic institutions can be put to. Is it not our task to analyse the hegemonic and ideological content of the relationship between the state bureaucracy and Organization 14(6) Articles the economic forces of capitalism? Ideology works precisely because it taps into the con cealed realm of fantasy that underlies and conditions the contents we ascribe to language and that prevents us from challenging ideologi cal representations. Effective critical interventions therefore must be made with an eye to 'traversing the fantasy'-a term Žižek borrows from Lacanian therapy-as opposed to engaging only in rational-deliberative political argument which is sustained by social fantasies. Liberty and democracy, the signifi ers that are of such vital importance for the Western liberal-democratic project in all of its guises, are effectively fantasies that sustain the hegemony of the global capitalist system: 'You are free to do anything, as long as it involves shopping', or, 'you are free to express whatever political views, as long as it involves voting'. Equally, the liberal ideal of the open society might well be able to cater democratically for a whole host of competing values, but in the end a democratic bureaucracy will always apply a type of rationality that has been institutionalized and legitimated by hegemonic social forces.
2 For Žižek, openness means questioning the ideological workings of the allegedly post-ideological discourse of the open society. Once we accept the social democratic idea of the modern capitalist market economy cum welfare state it is easy to claim that one should avoid both extremes (total freedom of the market and excessive state intervention). However, true openness 'would consist in transforming the very overall balance of the social edifi ce, enforcing a new structural principle of social life that would render the very fi eld of the opposition between market and state obsolete' (Žižek, 2004a: 73) . As such we should resist what Žižek calls the 'ultimate liberal blackmail' contained in the argument that any alternative to capitalism merely paves the way for totalitarianism.
The fi rst task therefore is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to offer clear alternatives to change things with reference to commonly accepted discourses (which then inevitably end in a cul-de-sac of debilitating impossibility: 'What can we do against global capital?'). A Žižekian reading of popular management discourse would by defi nition be 'unreasonable'; it would fully assume the tenets of the discourse and push these to the point of their absurdity: what if we really took serious Tom Peters' or Michael Hammer's exhortations of 'breaking all the rules' or 'starting again with a blank sheet of paper'? Whilst Žižek does not carry out such a reading on management texts, he does perform, for example, a brilliant and most entertaining 'short-circuit' on the idea of Christianity, which he presses into service as an argument against faith in spiritual reality, and in favour of a dialectical materialism (Žižek, 2001) . As Kay (2003: 125) puts it: 'The Church of England would indeed be amazed to learn that the true purpose of its teaching was to enable the under class to band together for therapy and revolution'. In the context of OMS, O'Doherty's (2004) excessively literal (and hence deeply subversive) review of the Financial Times Handbook of Management would be a recent example of a reading which aims at 'traversing the fantasy'.
However valuable and amusing such readings may seem, they also point to the impossibility of fully conceptualizing radical political change. What will emerge when traversing the fantasy cannot be predicted in advance. Thus, Žižek's theoretical aim is ultimately a negative one: he does not present a concrete vision of what a new socio-economic order would look like. Yet, by not offering us a traditional utopian picture of what things would be like after the break, he forces us to think the break itself. As such he provides a utopian form which is an answer to the liberal ideological conviction that there can be no alternative to the capitalist system. In fact, the demand to establish positive criteria of the desirable society is fundamental to liberal political theory from Locke to Rawls (Jameson, 2005) but is alien to Marxism (Calvino, 1987) .
Žižek, the Great Utopian? (Or How to Rescue 'Openness')
One should have the courage to affi rm that, in a situation like today's, the only way really to remain open to a revolutionary opportunity is to renounce facile calls to direct action, which necessarily involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. (Žižek, 2004b: 72) It should be clear from the previous section that Žižek has not only liberalism in his sights. For Žižek, the contemporary fashion of wanting to create continuous micro-political movement guarantees that nothing will change, and only the full acceptance of the desperate closure of the present global situation can push us towards actual change. Succumbing to the urge of 'doing something,' attempts at building small-scale, local, micro-political alternatives, will only contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. Not surprisingly, Žižek has come under fi re from the left in recent years. Robinson and Tormey (2004) argue that Žižek's uncompromizing language, offering a stark 'all or nothing' choice, precludes any productive engagement in empirical debates. Laclau and Butler (Butler et al., 2000) chastise him for a lack of rigorous analysis of the social contingencies of capitalism and left politics, and in a recent book Ernesto Laclau (2005) mischievously asks whether Žižek, by dismissing all partial struggles, is perhaps anticipating the invasion of beings from another planet who will save us. Yet, to clarify his position: Žižek is not against political activity per se (his own actions prove otherwise)-it is just that he believes that traditional political activity (e.g. institutionalized politics within the democratic-parliamentary order) simply does not contain the capacity for radical change (Žižek, 2003) .
Žižek is also very much at odds with contemporary currents in OMS which seem to be moving in 'cautious' directions. As Parker (2002: 217) suggests:
Whether in the realms of theoretical abstraction or grant-driven policy application, the commonality is a withdrawal from vainglorious claims to be able to change the world. Hubris has had its nemesis, and we live after utopia. Fleming (2004: 41) (WOBS, 2001) , detects an 'anti-modernist, anti-enlightenment, anti-progress and anti-emancipatory stance' amongst the contributions. As the editors suggest, 'Emancipation almost always means enslavement for something or someone. There are few grounds for liberationary optimism as chronological time kicks us into the 21st Century' (WOBS, 2001: xxxiv) . The implication is that it is futile to imagine or envisage any 'alternative' to the present because it will be just as oppressive as what we have now. Grey and Garsten (2002: 10) maintain that there exists a link between Utopia-'a blueprint for a desired world which is nevertheless located in present day concerns'-and totalitarianism, which 'is the consequence of the presumption of utopians to know what the world is and should be'. They argue that 'this totalitarianism provided an impetus for the development of the anti-utopianism of Popper …' which in turn has fed 'ironically, into a market utopianism that has recently taken on a radical new form. This we understand to be the utopia (or utopias) of disorganized capitalism and central to it are new understandings of work' (Grey and Garsten, 2002: 10) . If the anti-Utopian, Popper-inspired, 'bureaucratic' response is therefore clearly inadequate, so is the anti-enlightenment, antiemancipatory stance we fi nd in much of the critical management studies literature. As Fleming perceptively points out with regards to the WOBS approach, [It] confl ates this historical pessimism with a paralysing political doubt in which there is little reason to hope. While there are undoubtedly close connections between these two types of pessimism, they do indicate quite markedly different analytical territories. It is important that history and politics are never reduced to each other; what has been, what is and what might be cannot be smoothed out into a clear chain of equivalences. (Fleming, 2004: 46) Commentators such as Jameson (2005) and Massumi (2002) have pointed out how decentered thinking and art reinforce the new social and economic forms of late capital more than they undermine it. In casting doubt on all the older programs of critique and critical distance they seem to offer training in the new logic. Indeed, their endorse ment of anti-essentialist multiplicity and their perspectivism replicate the very rhetoric of the latecapitalist marketplace as such. The result is a zeitgeist where everything from the economic to the philosophical is stamped with the same forms and logic, irrespective of political and ideological commitment. Žižek directly confronts this zeitgeist in a curiously hybrid approach to the social, one that is both extremely sceptical and blindingly trustful. He combines the darkest historical pessimism with an unshakeable belief in universal emancipation. What he offers us is the future as disruption of the present, as a radical and systemic break with a future which is simply a prolongation of our capitalist present.
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Žižek and the Impossibility of the Open Society Christian de Cock and Steffen Böhm
For Žižek politics proper always involves a kind of short circuit between the universal and the particular; it involves the paradox of a singular that appears as a stand-in for the universal, destabilizing the 'natural' functional order of relations in the social body. Thus, we should not see the universal (e.g. 'the non-exploitative', 'the egalitarian') in terms of an acontextual absolute, but rather as a culturally specifi c absolute (manifested as exception-the bone-in-the-throat-to the dominant form of the day):
The position of universality is not simply one which fl oats above differences, mediating or encompassing them all, but the position of knowing how to traverse the fi eld with an additional, more radical difference, a difference which cuts each particular part from within. (Žižek 2004b: 89) The way to effect change therefore is to seize on this excep tion, or on the random, contingent factor in the current scheme of things, and force its universal implications so as to produce a new historical order. Žižek's point of reference here is the old Left tradition of 'the Day'; the break that inaugurates the new; the radical act we often, for want of a better term, call revolution, (the moment when, briefl y, there is an opening for an act to intervene into a situation). This act, a key Žižekian concept, cannot ever be reduced to an outcome of objective conditions. The very disturbing implication of Žižek's 'act' from the point of view of political change lies precisely in its radical openness. The 'act proper' is radically unaccountable; one can never fully foresee its consequences, in particular the way it will transform the existing symbolic space. It is a sudden collective movement that can never be predicted in advance, that strikes the least likely place and the least likely col lective agents or actors (Jameson, 2005 ). Žižek's concept of the act is thus incompatible with political calculation and liberalist administration.
3 In a truly radical political act the opposition between a crazy, destructive gesture and a strategic political decision momentarily breaks down. Only later, in a subsequent move, can the act be properly politicized. He imagines some form of gratifi cation inherent in the very confrontation with pessimism and the impossible:
In a genuine revolutionary breakthrough, the utopian future is neither simply fully realized, present, nor simply evoked as distant promise which justifi es present violence-it is rather as if, in a unique suspension of temporality, in the short circuit between the present and the future, we are-as if by Grace-briefl y allowed to act as if the utopian future is (not yet fully here, but) already at hand, there to be seized. Revolution is experienced not as a present hardship we have to endure for the sake of the happiness and freedom of future generations, but as the present hardship over which this future happiness and freedom already cast their shadow-in it, we are already free even as we fi ght for freedom … Revolution is … its own ontological proof, an immediate index of its own truth. (Žižek, 2002a: 259-260) The act combines voluntarism, an active attitude of taking risks, with a more fundamental fatalism: 'one acts, makes a leap, and then one hopes that things will turn out all right' (Žižek, 2002b: 81) . The search for a guarantee Organization 14(6) Articles is simply an expression of fear before the abyss. Žižek thus tackles headon the fundamental anxiety which underpins what he calls the 'liberal blackmail': the fear of losing one's familiar world in exchange for a world in which all known things and experiences-positive as well as negative-will have been obliterated.
In summary, for Žižek our passage through the fundamental fantasy of capitalism and liberal democracy will require the spontaneous and violent birth of new models of socio-political arrangement, just as the spontaneous formation of the Paris commune can be seen as a model for Marx's communism. The demands emanating from these new socio-political arrangements, if they are to make a true difference, have to be by defi nition 'unreasonable', 'impossible' even, which stands in stark contrast to the constant reference by organizational liberalists for the open society to be based on reason, with any excessive interventions immediately denounced as leading to totalitarianism. Whilst not referring directly to him, Jameson's description of Utopia uncannily describes Žižek's challenge of 'openness' and as such serves as our postscript:
Utopia thus now better expresses our relationship to a genuinely political future than any current program of action, where we are for the moment only at the stage of massive protests and demonstrations, without any conception of how a globalized transformation might then proceed … The formal fl aw-how to articulate the Utopian break in such a way that it is transformed into a practical-political transition-now becomes a rhetorical and political strength in that it forces us precisely to concentrate on the break itself: a meditation on the impossible, on the unrealizable in its own right. This is very far from a liberal capitulation to the necessity of capitalism, however; it is quite the opposite, a rattling of the bars and an intense spiritual concentration and preparation for another stage which has not yet arrived. (Jameson, 2005: 233) Notes 1 Mouffe's key criticism of the present model of Western liberal democracy is that it is based on consensus and underpinned by the universal value of the 'free market'. She proposes the notion of 'agonistic democracy' which allows for a plurality of democratic positions, with liberal ideology being just one of those democratic positions: 'Contrary to the various liberal models … the agonistic approach … never forgets that the terrain in which hegemonic interventions take place is always the outcome of previous hegemonic practices and never a neutral one. This is why it denies the possibility of non-adversarial democratic politics and criticizes those who, by ignoring the dimension of "the political", reduce politics to a set of supposedly technical moves and neutral procedures' (Mouffe, 2005: 806) . The 'political' is precisely liberalism's blind spot because 'by bringing to the fore the inescapable moment of decision (in the strong sense of having to decide in an undecidable terrain), what antagonism reveals is the very limit of any rational consensus' (Mouffe, 2005: 804) . 2 Judith Butler (2006: 12) provides a revealing current example of how the 'democratic ideal' has been usurped by neo-conservative forces in American
